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1. Introduction
Recent events in world nancial markets have convinced, perhaps reminded, many
economists and policymakers that maintaining nancial and macroeconomic stability are
not separate policy challenges, at least some of the time. As a result, the issue of macro-
prudential regulation has moved centre-stage and seems set to become an evolving feature
of macroeconomic policies. The responsibilities of central banks look likely to increase.1
Perhaps more controversially, policymakers are also debating whether, and in what form,
constraints on so-called universal banking, as in the US Banking Act of 1933, should be
reintroduced.2
That debate over the merits of universal banks (that is, of banks which combine both
retail/utility banking and investment banking operations) is being ercely contested. On
one side, some are concerned that universal banks benet from a more or less explicit
taxpayer guarantee and hence a de facto funding subsidy. The consequent moral hazard
may then push banks to be larger and more risky than otherwise. Related to these concerns
are worries in some countries, such as the UK, that parts of the banking sector are not
su¢ciently competitive. On the other side, it is argued that economies of scale and scope
exist that can be exploited with universal banking such that their products and services
are cheaper and better tailored to clientsneeds, thus beneting the wider economy. The
debate is further complicated by a lack of agreement as to what constitutes the dividing line
between di¤erent kinds of banks and products.
In this paper a simple macroeconomic model is developed to study the competitiveness
of the banking sector and the desirability of universal banking. The relationship between
nancial intermediaries and the real economy is modelled: A nal-goods producing sector is
reliant for its production on the output of a stylized investment banking sector. In turn, the
investment banking sector is reliant on loans from a retail banking sector which is funded
by retail deposits. Initially we set out the problems facing the commercial banks and the
investment banks separately; we then mergethese institutions to model the implications
of universal banking.
Three key features are incorporated in the model in order to asses whether universal
banking is likely to be welfare improving. First, investment banks are assumed to make a
1Many economists and commentators argue that central banks need to be involved in both systemtic
regulation as well as monetary policy. See for example the analysis and recommendations contained in The
Squam Lake Report (2010). Recent reforms in the UK appear to be in step with the broad thrust of those
recommendations.
2The 1933 Act is popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act. Amongst other things it seprated retail
banking from investment banking. That provision was e¤ectively repealed in 1999 by the GrammLeach
Bliley Act.
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decision concerning the riskiness of their balance sheets, having access to both risky and
riskless trading strategies. As this risk is leveraged on commercial bank loans, the possibility
of insolvency is present if the strategy does not pay o¤. And since the nal goods producer
is also reliant on the investment banking sector, it too is vulnerable to events in the nancial
sector.
The second feature concerns the stochastic structure of the economy. Investment banking
may be vulnerable to a combination of common and idiosyncratic shocks. As a result, the
economy can be well-insured against shocks or extremely vulnerable to shocks, depending
on whether common or idiosyncratic shocks are dominant. In addition, a common shock
to the output of the investment banks is introduced, similar to the quality of capital shock
in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
The third feature is that in the event of default by an investment bank, commercial
banks are bailed out in order to protect retail depositors. Thus depositors have no need
to monitor commercial banks and commercial banks have no need to monitor investment
banks. However, the bail out is costly to agents as a whole since remedial government action
is distortive.3
This simple framework provides initial insights into a number of issues of current interest.
We nd that more competition in the investment banking sector increases the probability
of default. That is because more competition lowers prot margins making banks less able
than otherwise to absorb losses. The increased probability of default increases the spread
on commercial bank loans as a risk premium is factored in. Ultimately, though, increased
competition is no bad thing; it lowers markups, reduces the price of the investment banks
output and ultimately increases nal goods production and agentswelfare.
The relative roles of idiosyncratic and systematic shocks to the investment banks are
analyzed. The cost to the taxpayer following a banking bail-out, under various assumptions
about the relative dominance of these shocks, is undertaken. When idiosyncratic shocks
dominate, this cost is relatively low. That is because price expectations errors are relatively
modest, on average. On the other hand, when shocks are common, investment banks
forecast errors of future prices, and hence of their revenue stream, can sometimes be very
large. In that case, the government bail-out can be rather costly.
Finally, the issue of universal banking versus separated banking is considered, again
under a number of scenarios about the constellation of shocks hitting the investment banks.
3Among academic papers comparing the separated and universal banking structures are Boyd, Chang
and Smith (1998) who argue that a universal banking structure requires a larger FDIC involvement. See
also Boot and Thakor (1997). However, to our knowledge, the present paper is the rst one providing a
relevant welfare analysis.
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Absent quality of capital shocks, universal banking seems to welfare dominate separated
banks. The key trade-o¤ that emerges is one between double marginalization and relatively
low default when banks are separated, against competitive pricing and increased government
bailouts with universal banks. The welfare dominance of universal banking is rising in
the volatility of trading strategies as the risk premium that would otherwise impact the
lending between commercial and investment banks is eradicated. It appears that double
marginalization combined with the required credit spread is, in welfare terms, a more costly
distortion than distortive government bail-outs. On the other hand, when shocks to the
overall e¢ciency of the nancial system predominate, universal banking remains attractive,
but perhaps less so. Despite boosting the output of the investment banks, and hence nal
goods production (and hence consumption), the universal banking results in larger taxpayer
bail-outs and a higher level of equilibrium labour supply. Finally, we briey examine the
costs and benets of competition. We nd that, when shocks are unfavorable, the optimal
degree of competitiveness of separate banking rms is higher than for universal rms. That
follows because banks with some market power have a cushion of prots giants adverse
shocks which is benecial as there is an excess burden associated with government bailouts.
1.1. Outline of paper
Sections 2 through 5 set out the components of the model covering the behavior of private
agents, commercial banks, nal goods producers and investment banks. Section 6 analyses
credit spreads, the e¤ects of idiosyncratic shocks and the costs of the commercial bank bail
out. In Section 7 the aggregate equations of the baseline model are set out. In Section
8 the impact of common shocks (to the investment banks) on the cost of bank bail outs
is examined. In Section 9 the models implications for the costs and benets of universal
versus separate retail-investment banking are examined. Sections 10 and 11 examine the
aggregate model equations under various specications for the stochastic structure of the
investment banking sector and under various policy environments (i.e., universal versus
separate banking). These sections also analyze the implications of the quality of capital
shock for universal versus separate banking. We conclude in Section 12.
2. The Model: Households
There is a large number of identical agents in the economy who evaluate their utility using
the following criterion:
E0
1X
t=0
t (log(Ct) t) : (2.1)
4
Et denotes the expectations operator at time t, is the discount factor, Ct is consumption
and Nt =
R
i
Nt(i)di is labour, where Nt(i) is the quantity of labour supplied to rm i. 0
measures the labour supply elasticity while is a preference parameter.
Consumption is dened over a basket of goods and indexed by i, Ct
hR 1
0
ct(i)
1
di
i
1
where 1 is the elasticity of substitution : The price-level, Pt, is Pt =
hR 1
0
pt(i)
1 di
i 1
1
:
The demand for each good is given by
Yt(i) =
pt(i)
Pt
Y dt ; (2.2)
where pt(i) is the nominal price of the nal good produced by rm i and Y dt denotes aggregate
demand. All rms pay the same real wage for the same labour. As a result, wt(i) = wt; 8i:
And since all households provide the same share of labour to all rms the agents nominal
ow budget constraint is
PtCt +D
h
t+1 = R
h
tD
h
t +WtNt t: (2.3)
Dht is the nominal value of deposits in the commercial bank at the start of date t. Between
date t 1 and the start of t these balances earn a nominal gross interest return of Rht . In
period t agents have to decide how much of their current wealth to place in the retail bank,
Dht+1. Wt is the nominal wage in period t, and t is prots remitted to the individual net
of the cost of deposit insurance and bailing out of banks. So, it is assumed that any retail
bank that makes a loss has those losses made good by the taxpayer and is allowed to go on
trading.
Necessary conditions for an optimum include:
Ct =
wt
; (2.4)
and
Et
t
Ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
=
1
Rht
: (2.5)
The environment is such that there is a unique stochastic discount factor,
t;t+k =
CtPt
Ct+kPt+k
, and Et f t;t+kg = Et
kY
j=0
1
Rht+j
: (2.6)
3. The retail bank sector
There is a continuum of retail (or commercial) banks indexed by i. Banks pay an interest
rate on their deposits of Rht : That deposit rate will be common across banks and need not
be indexed by i. In the loans market banks are monopolistic competitors and set loan rates,
Rct(i): So, following Aksoy et. al. (2009), banks face the following demand for loans
Bct (i) =
Rct(i)
Rct
Bct : (3.1)
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Here Bct (i) is bank is lending, R
c
t is a measure of the average interest rate on loans,
Rct =
hR 1
0
Rct(i)
1+ di
i 1
1+
, and Bct is aggregate demand for loans, B
c
t =
hR 1
0
Bct (i)
1
di
i
1
;
where 1 is the elasticity of substitution between loans. The objective of each bank,
therefore, is to maximize expected prots by choosing the rate charged on lending. If all
borrowers remains solvent, the commercial bank will earn nominal return Rct per unit loaned.
In the case of default, the assets of the borrower are repossessed by the commercial bank.
The commercial banks problem is studied in full in section 6.
4. The nal goods sector
The production of nal goods depends on At, common to all producers, and a nancial
product, Xt(i):
Yt(i) = AtXt(i): (4.1)
We wish to think of Xt(i) as a bundle of services from an investment banking sector,
comprising nancial and consultancy services. The assumption is clearly that these nancial
services are necessary for production of the nal output and that when the output of such
services is low so too is the output of the nal goods sector, ceteris paribus. The behavior
of the investment bank is described in more detail presently. At may be thought of as an
aggregate shock to the quality of nancial capital, or as a utilization shock, reecting factors
such as the costs of using the nancial system.
Firms set prices to maximize their prot
max
Pt(i)Xt(i)
Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i) qtXt(i) ;
where Yt(i) =
Pt+k(i)
Pt+k
Yt and qt =
Qt
Pt
are the demand for nal good i and the real price
of the output of the nancial sector, respectively.
In a symmetric equilibrium Pt(i)
Pt
= 1, and using the rst order conditions for rms, it is
straightforward to derive an aggregate real price, (4.2), and the aggregate demand for the
nancial product (4.3):
qt =
( 1)
At; (4.2)
Xdt = Yt=At: (4.3)
5. The investment bank sector
Agents deposit savings in commercial banks. The commercial banks bundle and pass these
funds to an investment banking sector. The investment banks in the model need loans
from commercial banks to pay the wage bill ahead of selling their output to the nal goods
sector. However the amount of output is a¤ected by investment banksproduction or trading
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strategies. The more risky the investment bankstrading strategy, the more uncertain is
the amount of input they can provide to the nal goods sector. Investment banks have to
decide on the riskiness of their activities, given their expectations of how protable they
will be; so the degree of risk is an endogenous variable4. The idea is to reect in a simple
way both the importance and potential riskiness of nancial intermediation in the economy.
If the investment bank turns out to be less protable than expected it could have negative
net assets. In that event, the banks losses are in e¤ect made good by the taxpayer and it
is allowed, next period, to continue trading. If the bank makes a prot, this is remitted to
private agents. These assumptions limit the horizon of the investment banksoptimization
problem and ensure a demand for funds from the commercial banking sector.
The investment bank produces output at t + 1, Xt+1(j), by employing labour at time
t. Labour is employed in combination with a choice two strategies. One is a safe strategy
with output per unit labour of t > 0, which is known ex ante. Denote the output using
the safe strategy by Xst+1;1(j) (where the superscript s indicates supplyand the subscript
1 indicates the safe technology) so that
Xst+1;1(j) = tNt(j): (5.1)
Nt(j) is the labour input employed by investment bank j. Labour is homogeneous and can
be used in conjunction with either the safe strategy just described or with a risky strategy,
to which all banks have access. The risky strategy is described by
Xst+1;2(j t"t+1(j)Nt(j): (5.2)
Here, t > 0 is the time t expected return from employing the risky strategy; this expectation
is common to all investment banking rms. "t+1(j) reects a bank-specic shock in period
t. It is constructed so that "t 0; and Et"t+1 = 1, all t; j. The cumulative distribution of
"t+1 is denoted by F ("), is time-invariant and common to all banks.
Ex post, the average return to labour will in general di¤er across strategies. It is
important to note that nothing precludes the investment banking rm employing a mixed
strategy. Thus, it may employ some proportion of labour st 2 [0; 1] in the safe strategy and
(1 st) in the risky strategy so that
Xst+1(j) = [(1 st t"t+1(j) + st t]Nt(j): (5.3)
At the start of period t the investment bank borrows Bt(j) =WtNt(j) from retail banks. At
the start of the next period, the investment bank receives Qt+1(j)Xt+1(j), and pays Bt(j)RCt
4For example, consider an investment bank that has made losses while trading on world nancial markets
on its own account. Other things constant, that bank will then be less able to provide nancial or other
services (e.g., underwriting) relating to raising of equity for the nal goods rms. Of course, these activities
are not modelled explicitly, but these are the kind of issues that we have in mind.
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to the retail bank, where Qt+1(j) denotes the price per unit Xt+1(j), and RCt is the interest
due on the loan.
The market for the output of the investment banking sector is assumed to be imperfectly
competitive and the demand for output of bank j is
Xdt (j) =
Qt(j)
Qt
Xdt : (5.4)
The superscript d indicates demand, and 1 is the demand elasticity. The aggregate
price next period, Qt+1, and aggregate demand, Xt+1, are exogenous to the banks decision,
and not fully predictable. It will turn out that the expectation of the next period price and
demand does not a¤ect the investment banks optimal choice of st:
Clearly, the optimal strategy includes selling everything demanded ex-post:
Xdt+1(j) = X
s
t+1(j) = Xt+1(j): (5.5)
Combining (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) and assuming a symmetric equilibrium, Nt(j) = N , shows
that the ex-post price depends on the realization of the relative rates of return across the
two strategies,
Qt+1(j) = Qt+1 [(1 st t"t+1(j) + st t]
Nt
Xdt+1
1
: (5.6)
Ex-ante, the investment bank needs to decide on st and the level of borrowing/labour input.
So, expected prot, Et t+1, of a bank with shock "t+1 is
Et t+1j"t+1) = max EtQt+1(j)Xt+1(j) WtNtRCt ; 0 ; (5.7)
= max
h
[[(1 st t"t+1 + st t]Nt]
1 1 EtX
1
t+1Qt+1 WtNtR
C
t ; 0
i
;
showing that default occurs when "t+1 is less than some optimally determined critical
threshold, "Dt (where D indicates default). A straightforward manipulation shows
"Dt =
1
(1 st t
24 WtN1t RCt
EtX
1
t+1Qt+1
!
1
st t
35 : (5.8)
It follows that the expected default probability is F "Dt . It is convenient to dene
Dt = "
D
t (1 st t + st t as the output of the threshold investment bank, for a choice
of st and Nt; given (functions of) expected demand and price, such that prots are zero in
expectation and the probability of default is also zero in expectation. Then, (5.8) implies
that the demand for labour is
Nt = (Dt)
1 EtX
1
t+1Qt+1
WtRCt
!
: (5.9)
Equation (5.8) shows that the investment bank can reduce the probability of default by
demanding less labour, since @"Dt =@Nt > 0. That means that an expanding investment
banking sector increases risk, other things constant. It also says that @"Dt =@Qt+1 < 0, so
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that a higher rate of expected default is associated with a lower expected price for nancial
intermediation services.
Given this threshold value of "D, expected prot of an investment bank is
Et Et
+1Z
"D
h
Qt+1 (Xt+1)
1
([(1 st t"+ st t]Nt)
( 1)
i
f (") d" 1 F "Dt WtR
C
t Nt: (5.10)
Analytically, this is a complex problem as it is dened over the joint density of
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors5. To retain tractability we therefore assume that
investment banks do not take the spread of possible outturns for Q into account; loosely
speaking they are ignoringmacro risk. Simplifying (5:10) and using (5.8) to substitute for
Nt, one can write the banks maximand as
1
WtRCt
WtRCt
EtX
1
t+1Qt+1
Et . Hence, one may state
the investment banks problem:
max
Dt;"D;st
D 1t
0@+1Z
"D
(1 st t"+ st t
Dt
( 1)
f (") d" 1 F "Dt
1A (5.11)
s.t. Dt = (1 st t"Dt + st t ; (5.12)
"Dt 0; (5.13)
st 0; (5.14)
st 1: (5.15)
The problem facing the j-th investment bank is to maximize expected prots by: supplying
an amount Xst+1(j) to the nal goods producer; choice of trading strategy, st; hiring an
amount of labour, Nt(j); and hence incurring debt, WtNt(j) plus interest. These choices
are made given: the interest charge on borrowing, RCt ; the expected return from employing
the safe and risky strategies; and expected demand Xdt (j). A key consideration is that the
probability of default is rising in the amount borrowed for a given share of risky investment.
Recognition of that factor led to the denition of "Dt above. Thus, a solution to (5.11)-(5.15)
includes a choice of ("D ; s ), for each t, where a corner solution is dened as "D = 0 and/or
s = 0. A Lagrangian for this problem is analyzed fully in the appendix. Optimality requires
(1 st t + d = 0; (5.16)
where d and are multipliers associated with (5.12) and (5.13), respectively. It is necessary
either that d > 0 and "Dt = 0; or d = = 0. Whenever d > 0; optimality for "
D
t requires
that st 6= 1 and 0: In this case, "Dt = 0; any realization of " ensures nonnegative
5That is, writing the problem in full,
Et Nt(j); "
D(j); )s(j)) =
+1Z +1Z
Nt(j); "
D(j); s(j); Qt+1; Xt+1)f(Qt+1; Xt+1)dQt+1dXt+1:
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expected prots and no expected default. On the other hand, when "Dt > 0; expected
prots are still positive but there is potential for default. Hence, = 0 as the marginal
investment bank no longer produces Dt. Thus:
Proposition 5.1. There is no internal solution to (5.11)-(5.15).
Proposition 5.2. There are only two types of local maxima: (i) The rst is where the
probability of default is zero; F "Dt = 0: (ii) The second is where investment banks choose
st = 0:
Proposition 5.1 is established in the appendix by demonstrating that an internal
equilibrium violates the second order necessary conditions for a local maximum. Since
the solution to (5.11)-(5.15) is characterized by the pair ("Dt ; st ), the two candidate optima
are those of Proposition 5.2. Furthermore, the rst of these candidates will also entail
0 < st < 1, whilst the second necessarily implies F "
D
t > 0.
For a given distribution of risky returns, the optimal choice of st depends on t, the
expected relative rates of return across the risky and safe strategies, t t t. To see
this, note that the optimality condition with respect to Dt is
( 1)D 2t
24 1+1Z
"D
(1 st t"+ st t
Dt
( 1)
f (") d" 1 F "D
35 = 0:
With positive default probability, it has been established that = 0 and s = 0: Thus:
Corollary 5.3. There is a level of t,
l, such that the local maximum with positive
probability of default exists if and only if t
l. If the probability of default is positive
then s = 0 and the default threshold satises equality
+1Z
"D
"t
"D
( 1)
f (") d" =
1
1 F "D : (5.17)
Combining (5.17) with (5.10) one sees that in this case investment banks arrange things
so that expected prot is a constant proportion, 1= ( 1), of expected costs. This is
a generalization of the standard result of a xed mark up in a deterministic production
environment under monopolistic competition.
Corollary 5.4. There exists h, dened in the appendix, such that the local maximum
with "D = 0 exists if and only if t
h: The optimal s is deduced in the next Corollary
5.5.
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Following Proposition 5.1 one can compare expected prots associated with the risky
strategy described in Corollary 5.3 with the maximum expected prot which can be obtained
when the expected probability of default is zero.
To nd the optimal safe strategy, investment banks solve the following problem
max
s;N
Et
+1
Et
Z
0
h
Qt+1 (Xt+1)
1
([(1 s t"+ t]Nt)
( 1)
i
f (") d" WtR
C
t Nt: (5.18)
subject to 0 s 1 and that expected prots are positive, even when " = 0;
EtQt+1 (Xt+1)
1
( tNt)
( 1)
WtR
C
t Nt > 0: (5.19)
This optimization problem is set out in full in the appendix. We state the results as follows:
Corollary 5.5. The solution of problem (5.18-5.19) depends on t as follows:
i) If t 1; it is optimal to employ only the safe strategy (s = 1):
ii) If 1 t
h, (same as Corollary 5.4 ) there is an internal solution; neither of the
constraints are binding (0 < s < 1) and the solution satises
+1Z
0
( 1)
1 s
s
+ 1
1
f (") d" = 0: (5.20)
Moreover, applying the implicit function theorem to (5.20) which denes optimal s , one
can establish (see the appendix Section 13.5) that s declines in .
iii) if ht t there is only a corner solution with binding constraint (5.19) and optimal s
dened as
+1Z
0
( t" 1)
1 s
s t
"+ 1
1
f (") d" ( 1)
+1Z
0
(1 s)
s t
"+ 1
1 1
f (") d"+ = 0:
Having characterized expected prots under alternate strategies, it is now possible to
clarify the nature of the global maximum.
Proposition 5.6. There exists a unique switching level of relative rates of return, sw,
where l sw h, such that a local maximum dened in Corollary 5.5 ("D = 0) is a
global one if and only if t
sw; while the solution dened in Corollary 5.3 is a global
maximum if and only if t
sw:
Consider the case where sw > 1:
Corollary 5.7. If swt > 1, then for t 2 [1 swt ] The optimal choice of s is 0 <
h
h+k
<
s < 1:
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The proofs and expressions for l sw h; k are in the appendix. Proposition 5.6 shows
that as t declines from a value greater than
sw to a value less than sw; the investment
banks optimal choice of s switches from a completely riskyone, s = 0, to one where there
is a signicant share of investment in the safe technology s > 0. So a smooth change in the
economic environment can result in a jumpin investment decisions. Figure 5.1 summarizes
the choice of optimal s as varies.
Figure 1: Prot and optimal strategy.
To conclude, given , investment banks decide on the optimal level of default probability.
In what follows the case where that default probability is positive will be of particular
interest; that is where t
sw
t and F "
D
t > 0.
5.1. Competition and risk taking
The above simple model can be used to look at the interaction between risk, default and the
intensity of competition. To that end equation (5.17) is studied to investigate the relation
between competition in the investment banking sector (reected in ) and risk (measured
as the probability of default, F ("D)). The next proposition demonstrates that the default
rate increases with competition.
Proposition 5.8. For F ("D) > 0, the default threshold, "D, and the probability of default
F ("D), increase with the intensity of competition, .
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Proof. Dene G "Dt =
+1Z
"D
"t
"Dt
( 1)
f (") d" 1 1 F "
D
t . Then, by equation (5.17),
G "Dt = 0: It follows from the implicit function theorem that
d"D
=
@G
@"D
=
@G
> 0: (5.21)
Also,
@G
=
1
2
"mZ
"D
"t
"Dt
( 1)
log
"t
"Dt
f (") d"+
1
( 1)
2 1 F "
D
t > 0;
and G "Dt = 0 were derived from the rst order condition with respect to "
D
t , for a prot
maximization problem under the assumption s = 0: Therefore, the second order condition
is equivalent to @G
@"D
< 0 when "D is a local maximum. That proves
d"D
> 0; and
dF "D
= f "D
d"D
> 0: (5.22)
The intuition for these results seem straightforward enough; the lower mark-up shrinks
the cushion of excess prots that absorbs the impact of low " draws. This basic result
seems, in spirit, consistent with arguments already in the literature that competition in
nancial markets may promote risk taking (see for example, Hellmann et.al. (2000), Bolt
and Tieman, (2004), Repullo (2004) and Allen and Gale( 2004)). The real issue, of course,
is whether increased competition is welfare enhancing. For example, some microeconomic
models suggest that competition not only increases risk but may also improves entrepreneurs
access to credit (Bolt and Tieman, 2004) and reduces the loan rate (Boyd and De Nicoló
2005). Thus higher risk may be positively correlated with higher investment, and therefore
may promote production and welfare. That positive relation is also documented in some
recent empirical work (see Claessence and Laeven 2005). This is exactly what is observed in
our model, since employment, and therefore the output of the nancial sector, is positively
related to the expected default threshold (See equation (5.9)). Later it is shown that in the
present framework, increased competition will result in higher production and lower prices
for nancial services, which in turn will result in higher consumption and welfare.
5.2. Aggregate behavior of the investment banking sector
It is straightforward now to characterize the aggregate behavior of the investment banking
sector. Using the formula for aggregate supply, Xt =
R 1
0
Xt(i)
1
di
1
, one can derive a
relation between labour and aggregate output of the investment banking sector:
EtXt+1 = Nt
241Z
0
[(1 st "+ st t]
1
f (") d"
35 1 : (5.23)
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Then, equation (5.9) in combination with (5.23) provide an expression for the expected
price,
Et
Qt+1
WtRCt
= EtD
1
t
241Z
0
[(1 s t"+ t]
1
f (") d"
35 1 1 : (5.24)
Formula (5.24) shows that the average markup in the investment banking sector declines
with risk, "D:
Consider the case where the investment bank optimally sets s = 0. Then
EtXt+1 tNt t; (5.25)
EtQt+1 =
WtR
C
t
t
"D
1
1
; (5.26)
where
241Z
0
"
1
f (") d"
35 1 is less than 1; increases in , and converges to 1 as
approaches innity. Formula (5.25) shows that the expected output of the investment
banking sector is increasing in the degree of competition, while formula (5.26) shows that
the expected mark up over e¤ective labour costs declines in the intensity of competition.
6. Commercial Banking and the Credit Spread
As described earlier, commercial banks attract deposits and o¤er loans to investment banks.
Commercial banks benet from credit diversication so that loans of commercial bank i,
B(i) are fully diversied across all investment banks. They act as monopolistic competitors
and maximize expected prot, Et t+1, given the demand for loans, (3.1), where
Et t+1(R
c
t (i)) = EtR
c
t (i)B
c
t (i) R
h
tB
c
t (i): (6.1)
If a borrower remains solvent, the commercial bank will earn nominal return Rct per
unit loaned. In the case of default, the assets of the borrower are repossessed by the
commercial bank. So, for the borrowers for whom "t+1(j) < "D, the expected repayment is
EtQt+1(j t"t+1(j)Nt only. Note that at the expected default threshold for the investment
bank dened as EtQt+1("
D
t"
DNt = B
c(i)Rct(i); where EtQt+1(j) = EtQt+1 ("j)
1 ( from
(5.6) in assumption that s = 0 ) and in general the assets to liabilities ratio of borrower j
can be expressed as
Et
Qt+1(j t"t+1(j)
Rct(i)Wt
= Et
"t+1(j)
"Dt
1
:
The expected return of the commercial bank may then be written as
EtB
c
t (i)R
c
t(i) = B
c
t (i)R
c
t (i)
264"
DZ
0
"
"D
1
f(")d"+ 1 F ("D)
375 : (6.2)
Consequently, one can re-write the commercial banks objective in a slightly more convenient
form by combining (3.1), (6.1) and (6.2),
Et t+1(R
c
t(i)) =
Rct(i)
Rc
Rht
Rct
Rct (i)
Rct
BCt R
c
t ;
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where
"DZ
0
"
"D
1
f(")d"+ 1 F ("D) < 1: (6.3)
1= is interpreted as an insurance premium against default. By denition is a ratio of
expected to contract return. In a risk-free market t should be equal 1. The value 1=
corresponds to a minimum relative spread required for a zero expected prot. It is easy to
see that for a given distribution f , the ratio 1/ increases with the default threshold, "D:
The rst order condition with respect to the relative interest rate requires
RCt (i)
Rct 1
Rht
Rct
;
and since in equilibrium all banks charge the same interest rate
RCt = 1
1
Rht : (6.4)
Once again we can see that if the credit market were perfectly competitive ( ! 1); the
relative spread would be 1= : Expression (6.4) provides a measure of the spread,
spread = lnRCt lnR
h
t = ln 1
ln
264"
DZ
0
"
"D
1
f(")d"+ 1 F ("D)
375 : (6.5)
The following proposition is readily established:
Proposition 6.1. The credit spread increases with competition in the investment banking
sector,
d (spread)
> 0:
Proof. It follows immediately from (5.22) and (6.3) that
d (spread)
=
1
t
@ t
@"D
d"Dt +
d t
> 0;
since @
@"D
= 1
("Dt )
2
"DZ
0
"f(")d" < 0 and d t = 12
"DZ
0
"
"D
1
ln( "
"D
)f(")d" < 0:
Moreover, from (6.5) it is easy to formulate Proposition 6.2.
Proposition 6.2. The credit spread declines with competition in the commercial banking
sector, d(spread) < 0:
This result is consistent with Proposition 5.8 above. Since competition increases the
expected default threshold, commercial bank loans are more risky and the spread is
consequently higher.
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6.1. Actual and expected default: pure idiosyncratic shock
First consider the case when shocks to investment banks are purely idiosyncratic. Then
aggregate output and expected price will be as in (5.23) and (5.24). If banks are investing
solely in the risky strategy, st = 0, then
Xt+1 = EtXt+1 tNt t; (6.6)
EtQt+1 =
WtR
C
t
t
"D
1 1
t : (6.7)
For investment bank i total revenue is recovered from (5.3) and (5.6)
Qt+1(i)Xt+1(i) = Qt+1Xt+1
tNt"t+1(i)
Xt+1
1 1
= Qt+1Xt+1
"t+1(i)
t
1 1
: (6.8)
That bank will default when "t+1(i) < "A; where the actual default threshold ("A) is dened
as
Qt+1Xt+1
"A
t
1 1
=WtR
C
t Nt: (6.9)
On the other hand, the expected default threshold is
EtQt+1Xt+1
"D
t
1 1
=WtR
C
t Nt: (6.10)
So, combining these equations it follows that
ln "A = ln "D
1
(lnQt+1 lnEtQt+1) : (6.11)
One concludes that competition reduces the impact of price misperceptions on equilibrium
outturns. In other words, actual and expected prices are closer on average as competition
increases and so too are expected and actual default levels.
The realized value of Qt+1 can be derived from equation (4.2)
Qt+1 = Pt+1At+1
( 1)
:
So the investment banking sector will be in default if either the nancial shock "t+1 or
macroeconomic shock At+1 is small
( 1)
At+1 t"t+1 <
wtR
C
t
t+1
: (6.12)
Formula (6.12) also shows that ination reduces the probability of default as it reduces the
value of liabilities. So, in this model, ination acts in part like a subsidy to investment
banking.
6.2. Cost of bail out of commercial bank
It is assumed throughout that the government guarantees the safety of deposits. It has
also been assumed that all commercial banks fully diversify their loan portfolios across all
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investment banks. So in the event of default, all banks in default will have identical negative
net worth. In that case the aggregate nominal cost of the bailout, PtGt, is straightforward to
calculate; it will be equal to the di¤erence between total deposit liabilities of the commercial
banking sector and the revenue of the nancial sector. That is,
PtGt = max( t(R
c
t 1); 0):
Here t(Rct 1) denotes the aggregate assets of the commercial banking sector less the
aggregate liabilities. These assets at the end of the period are the loans that are repaid.
One may calculate an explicit formula for t as follows.
A commercial bank will receive RctB
c
t from investment bank j if the the banks " draw is
larger than "A, dened above. The funds repaid by solvent investment banks are then equal
to RctB
c
t 1 F ("
A) .
On the other hand, the amount recovered from an insolvent investment bank is
Qt+1(j)Xt+1(j), which is the same as (6.8). So the aggregate loan recovery across all insolvent
investment banks is
Qt+1Xt+1
264"
AZ
0
h " i 1
f (") d"
375 :
Thus, it follows that
t+1 "
A = Qt+1Xt+1
264"
AZ
0
h " i 1
f (") d"
375+RctWtNt 1 F ("A) RhtWtNt: (6.13)
Recalling (6.6) and (6.7), and using (6.9), yields
t+1 "
A = Qt+1Xt+1
264"
AZ
0
h " i 1
f (") d"+
"A
1
1 F ("A)
Rht
Rct
375 : (6.14)
It seems intuitively plausible6 that t+1 declines in "A and that commercial banks will
have negative net assets only when the actual default rate is greater than some threshold
value, "A > "C , where "C solves the zero prot condition, t+1 "C = 0.
Furthermore, recalling the denition of the credit spread, (6.3) and (6.4), one can
show that the critical value of " for default is larger than the expected default rate,
"C > "D and that t+1 "D > 0: This, together with equation (6.11), implies that
government intervention is not required when the mistake in price prediction is relatively
low: Qt+1 EtQt+1.
It is straightforward to show that the probability of commercial bank insolvency and
the size of the government bail out increase with competition in the commercial banking
6Although intuitively plausible, there are some technical issues. These are explained in the appendix,
Section 13.7.
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sector7, represented by However, cheaper nancial intermediation may o¤set the costs of
bankruptcy. This is considered further below.
We assume that government intervention is costly. Such costs, g(Gt); can be associated
with monitoring costs and distortive taxation. It is also worth mentioning that rising
government expenditure will increase the gap between production and consumption since
Yt = Ct + g(Gt):
So, when the prices for nancial intermediation are reasonably predictable, it has been shown
in (6.11) that "A "D, and therefore t+1 "A is positive and government intervention is
not required, Gt = 0: Therefore, the implications for social welfare from purely idiosyncratic
shocks are limited. However, when the investment banking sector faces common, or
systematic, shocks then the impact on welfare may be substantial.
7. Aggregate equations of the model economy
Clearly the equilibrium relations of the model change depending on the nature of the shocks
and whether or not universal banking is considered. Here the set of equilibrium equations
is set out for the baseline model with separated banking and idiosyncratic shocks. As we
consider variations on the baseline, we indicate which key equations change and refer in
some cases to the appendix for further details.
7.1. Idiosyncratic shock with separate banking
The equations of the model in the case of purely idiosyncratic shocks with separate banking,
are set out below.
Denition 7.1. A monopolistically competitive equilibrium is a set of plans,fCt+k; Yt+k;
Nt+k; wt+k; Xt+k; qt+k t+k; R
c
t+k; R
h
t+k; q
e
t+1g1k=0;given initial conditions, fAt 1; Nt 1; Rht 1;
Rct 1; wt 1 g; and dynamics of policy variables, f t+k; g1k=0 ; and exogenous shocks,
fAt+k; t+k; g1k=0 ; and satisfying conditions ((7.1)-(7.11)).
7Given everything else constant, it reduces the spread as proved in Proposition 6.2,
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Et
t
Ct+1
1
t+1
=
1
Rht
(7.1)
Ct =
wt
; (7.2)
qt = At
( 1)
; (7.3)
Yt = AtXt; (7.4)
Xt+1 tNt (7.5)
wtR
C
t
tEt t+1qt+1
"Dt
1
; (7.6)
RCt = 1
1
Rht ; (7.7)
Ct = Yt g(Gt); (7.8)
Gt = max( t "
A ; 0); (7.9)
t+1 "
A =
qt+1Xt+1
1
264"
AZ
0
"
1
f (") d"+ "A
1
1 F ("A)
Rht
Rct
375 (7.10)
"A
"D
1
=
Etqt+1
qt+1
; (7.11)
Where "D; and are dened in ((7.12)-(7.14))
1 F "D =
1
+1Z
"D
"
"D
( 1)
f (") d"; (7.12)
"DZ
0
"
"D
( 1)
f(")d"+ 1 F ("D) ; (7.13)
241Z
0
"
1
f (") d"
35 1 : (7.14)
8. Systematic shock
Following the recent nancial crisis many researchers (for example, see Haldane, 2010)
have highlighted the importance of the common or systematic component of shocks hitting
the nancial system. In this section we derive the key formulas characterizing nancial
intermediation when the shock in the investment banking sector is common across all banks,
and is perceived as such. Later on, a di¤erent type of common shock is analyzed which a¤ects
the usefulness of the output of investment banks.
When the shock to investment banks is not purely idiosyncratic, then expected prices
and demand can be signicantly di¤erent from actual. If the shock is purely systematic, all
investment banking rms will have the same output and will charge the same price
Xt+1 t"t+1Nt: (8.1)
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Since the shock is common to all banks, all expect to charge the same price and produce
the same quantity
EtXt+1(j) = EtXt+1 tNt; (8.2)
EtQt+1(j) = EtQt+1: (8.3)
As a consequence, the discrepancy between actual and expected output is
Xt+1 = "t+1EtXt+1: (8.4)
8.1. Spread
To set RCt ; the commercial banks need to compute the expected return on credit. If
"t+1 < "
D; only a fraction, "t+1="D of loans will be repaid. Therefore, the spread component
will be slightly di¤erent to the situation when the shock is idiosyncratic,
s
t :=
"DtZ
0
"
"D
f(")d"+ 1 F ("Dt ) < 1: (8.5)
8.2. Actual default and the size of bailout: systematic shock
Default occurs when
Qt+1Xt+1 < WtR
C
t Nt; (8.6)
or equivalently if "t+1 < "A; where "A is dened as
"At =
WtR
C
t
tQt+1
=
EtQt+1
Qt+1
WtR
C
t
tEtQt+1
=
EtQt+1
Qt+1
"Dt :
In other words,
ln "At ln "
D
t = (lnQt+1 lnEtQt+1) :
When the shock is purely systematic, every commercial bank recovers either RctB
c
t or
Qt+1Xt+1, whichever is the smaller. Consider the threshold value "C when the prot of the
banking industry is zero:
t+1 = Qt+1Xt+1 R
h
tB
c
t ;
= NtR
C
t Wt
Qt+1 t
RCt Wt
"C
Rht
RCt
= 0:
Rearranging this last expression, one nds that
"C =
Rht
RCt
RCt Wt
EtQt+1
EtQt+1
Qt+1
=
Rht
RCt
EtQt+1
Qt+1
"D
1
:
One can conclude from this that commercial banks fail less often than investment banks
since,
"C =
Rht
RCt
"A < "A: (8.7)
When shock "t+1 hits the banking system, the net assets of the commercial banking sector
are
t+1 = Qt+1Xt+1 R
h
tB
c
t = NtR
h
tWt
"t+1
"C
1 : (8.8)
A bail out occurs only when t+1 is negative. Thus, the bail out will be
Gt = R
h
tWtNtmax 1
"t+1
"C
; 0
i
: (8.9)
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8.3. Aggregate equations: systematic shocks and separate banking
In considering separated banking, the system (7.1-7.11) is slightly transformed. First, the
dispersion term, t; is replaced by 1: Second, there is a slight change in the risk premium.
The new constant s is dened as in (8.5). The formulas for the expected and actual output
of investment banks become (14.13) and (14.14). There will be equations dening the default
threshold level of the trading strategies, which determines the solvency of commercial banks
as in (8.7). Finally, the formula for government support will be (8.9). The full set of
equations is set out in the appendix 14.2.
9. Cost and benet of vertical integration
The desirability of universal banks versus separate investment and commercial banking
entities is the subject of much current debate. The above framework allows one to begin
to examine some key underlying themes in that debate. To that end, consider the model
economy where one commercial bank is integrated with one investment bank. There is an
obvious cost associated with this course of action since risk will be less diversied8. On
the other hand, a benet ought to come from addressing double marginalization and the
insurance premium associated with two separate entities.
Assume that the integrated bank can directly invest in a risky or safe strategy. As before,
intermediation requires labour input. However, now the integrated bank cost of borrowing
is equal to the deposit rate, Rht : From equation (7.7) one sees the benets of integrated
banking. The reduction in cost consists of the elimination of a monopoly distortion among
commercial banks,
1
, which in the industrial organization literature is known as double
marginalization. There will also be savings associated with the premium 1
t
. So, in the
economy with integrated banking one replaces (7.7) with the simple equality
RCt = R
h
t :
However, on the downside, the cost of bail out, Gt, may increase signicantly.
Consider the purely idiosyncratic shock case in the absence of macroeconomic instability
(Qt+1 = EtQt+1). When commercial banks are separated from investment banks, the
commercial banking sector generates positive prot and the cost of government intervention
is zero, on average.
In an economy with global banking, "A = "C and the government will need to bail out
the sector if the idiosyncratic shock is smaller than "A: In this case, the total cost of the
8The benets from risk diversication was clearly shown in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). In our
model the absence of risk diversication in the banking sector is partly compensated by the government
deposit insurance policy.
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bailout will be
Gt = R
h
tWtNt
"AZ
0
1
"
"A
1
f (") d":
There always will be a proportion of global banks in trouble even when the shock is purely
idiosyncratic. In this case the small proportion of insolvent banks will need to be bailed out,
which will require the scal authorities to raise tax revenue. However, the whole economy
may benet from cheaper nancial intermediation resulting in lower costs of production.
On the other hand, when the shock is purely systematic, "C = "A, the cost of the bail
out will be,
Gt = R
h
tWtNtmax 1
"
"A
; 0
i
:
Purely systematic negative shocks can be very costly under universal banking, more so than
with separated banks. However, as noted previously, the cost of government intervention is
o¤set by the lower cost of nancial intermediation that universal banking permits.
In what follows we parameterize the model in order to form a preliminary view as to
how the model evaluates the potential trade-o¤s between universal and separate banking in
the face of di¤erent kinds of shocks.
10. Numerical analysis
The analysis of the impact of universal banking proceeds by comparison of welfare in the
stochastic steady states, given the assumed shock process. We begin by analyzing the
impact of idiosyncratic versus systematic shocks. Then we turn to shocks to the quality of
nancial capital. Further details of the parameterization and the full sets of equations for
permutations of the model are given in the appendix, Section 14.
10.1. Idiosyncratic shocks
In the stochastic steady state with separated banking, "A = "D: When commercial banks
are separated from investment banks, it is possible to diversify the risk completely. All
commercial banks have the same positive prot t+1 > 0; there is no default in the
commercial banking industry and "C = 0: Hence, there is a wedge between deposit and
loan rates. Furthermore, no government intervention is required, Gt = 0: On the other
hand, under universal banking, it is the case that: "C = "A = "D: The equilibrium equations
of the model change so that
RCt = R
h
t ; (10.1)
Ct = Yt g(Gt); (10.2)
Gt = Qt+1Xt+1
1
264"
DZ
0
"
1
"D
1
f (") d"
375 : (10.3)
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In other words, there is no wedge between the interest rates and government expenditure
is non-zero. We assume that the governments intervention is distortive in the sense that
every £1 of bailout costs the taxpayer £1.20; so the net distortion is 20%, g(Gt) = 0:2Gt:9
This costs is levied lump-sum across agents.
Table 1 contains the results of the numerical comparison between universal and separated
banking with idiosyncratic shocks. Social welfare is computed assuming a lognormal
distribution for ".10
Table 1: Idiosyncratic shocks RC C G G=C N Welfare Gain2
EDR1 = 3:8% ( = 0:20)
Separate 16:0% 0:59 0 0% 0:58
Universal 4:2% 0:66 0 0:2% 0:65 4:2%
EDR1 = 10% ( = 0:25)
Separate 16:7% 0:60 0 0% 0:59
Universal 4:2% 0:67 0 0:6% 0:66 4:3%
EDR = 19% ( = 0:30)
Separate 18:3% 0:61 0:00 0:0% 0:60
Universal 4:2% 0:69 0:01 1:5% 0:69 4:5%
EDR = 40% ( = 0:40)
Separate 25:0% 0:63 0:00 0:0% 0:63
Universal 4:2% 0:76 0:04 5:9% 0:77 4:9%
1 EDR is the expected default rate, F ("D). 2. Welfare is measured in
consumption equivalent.
It is worth recalling that F ("D) is endogenous. From Table 1 it appears that universal
banking is not only welfare superior to separated banking, but the gain is rising in the
variance of "; the increase in consumption required to compensate for separated banking is
monotonically rising in the variance of ". Higher volatility increases the insurance premium
under separated banking rms. And even in the extreme case of very high volatility, the
model suggests that universal banking is preferable to separated banking. In short higher
government expenditure (by way of a consumption-reducing, distortive bail-out) is o¤set by
a reduction in the insurance premium.
Another interesting observation is that volatility stimulates the economy. Since nancial
9Allgood and Snow (1998) estimate the marginal cost of raising tax revenue to be between 5% and 26%
depending on the assumption about the elasticity of labour supply. That is why we chose 20% for our
simulation.
10We also experimented with the gamma distribution and for di¤erent parameters. The conclusions in
the text were unaltered.
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intermediaries have an option to be bailed out, increasing volatility can be viewed as
providing increased upside risk. That stimulates the production of the investment banking
sector. One observes this in the higher level of employment, N: However, these result
are obtained under the restrictive assumption that the shock is purely idiosyncratic and
therefore diversiable from a macroeconomic perspective. In the following section we turn
to the opposite extreme and assume shocks are purely systematic, that is common across
investment banks.
10.2. Systematic shocks
Assuming that shocks are systematic, we now enquire how large would a negative shock
have to be for universal banking to be welfare reducing. Since we assume that , t = 1 in
steady state, there is no uncertainty about the price of nancial intermediation, so that
Q = q = A
( 1)
;
"A = "D:
For the case of separated banking we use system (14.9)-(14.20) from appendix 14.2 and
make the following substitutions: RCt = 1
1
s
Rht ; "
C = R
h
t
RCt
"D; wt = t; Yt = AtXt;
Xt+1 Nt"t+1; and t = 1: So,
Et
1
Ct+1
=
1
tRht
; (10.4)
CtR
h
t
1
= "D
1
q 1
1
s
; (10.5)
Ct = A Nt 1"t g(Gt); (10.6)
Gt+1 = R
h
t tNtmax 1
"t+1
"D 1
1
s
; 0 : (10.7)
However, to proceed we now have to construct equations for the stochastic steady state, in
particular for consumption and labour.
From equation (10.5) one concludes that CtRht is constant over time. Now dene new
constants
u =
1
"D 1
1
s
1
and
u1 = "
D
1
q 1
1
s
1
:
Then equations (10.4) and (10.5) can be rewritten as
CtR
h
t = u1; (10.8)
Et
1
Ct+1
=
1
1
: (10.9)
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One can now easily compute Et
n
1
Ct+1
o
. Consider equation (10.6) with a one period lead
which in combination with (10.7) implies
Ct+1 = Nt A "t+1
g
u
u1max [(u "t+1) ; 0] :
Nt
Ct+1
=
8<:
1
A "t+1
; if "t+1 u;
1
A "t+1
g
u
u1(u "t+1)
if if "t+1 < u:
Therefore, the expectation of
n
Nt
Ct+1
o
will depend on current consumption and the deposit
interest rate
Et
Nt
Ct+1
=
uZ
0
1
A " guu1 (u ")
f(")d"+
+1Z
u
1
A "
f(")d":
Denote the right hand side of this equation by s. Now use (10.9) in order to get Nt
Nt = u1 s;
which is also constant over time. From this one sees that labour demand does not change
with the realization of the shock, a key aspect of the way the investment banks problem is
set up.
Finally, one can combine (10.6) and (10.7) to yield
Ct ("t) = u1 s A "t
g
u
u1max [(u "t) ; 0] :
Hence, the equilibrium distribution of consumption and labour, and thus expected utility,
may be constructed, given an assumed distribution function for ".
It also emerges that, in steady state, consumption and the interest rate are inversely
related, given price stability (as in formula 10.8). Higher consumption increases wage
demands and therefore the interest rate needs to be lower to stimulate output.
For universal banking one obtains the distribution of consumption and labour in a similar
way to nd that
Ct ("t) = uu1 u A "t
g
uu
uu1max [(uu "t) ; 0] ;
and
Ng = uu1 u:
Note, that the constants di¤er from the previous case.11
11Specically, uu = "D; uu1 = "D
1
q
1
; and u =
uuZ
0
1
A " g
uu
uu1(uu ")
f(")d"+
+1Z
uu
1
A "f(")d":
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Table 2: systematic shocks Rh RC C G G=C N Welfare Gain2
EDR1 = 3:8% ( = 0:20)
F (") = 0:5
Separate 2:1% 13:8% 0:60 0 0% 0:60
Universal 2:0% 2:0% 0:67 0 0% 0:67 4:0%
F (") = 0:1
Separate 31:9% 47:0% 0:39 0 0% 0:60
Universal 31:8% 31:8% 0:43 0 0:6% 0:67 3:1%
F (") = 0:01
Separate 62:7% 81:3% 0:38 0:00 0:3% 0:60
Universal 66:3% 66:3% 0:41 0:05 11:8% 0:67 1:7%
F (") = 0:001
Separate 100:4% 123:3% 0:31 0:05 17:1% 0:60
Universal 107:5% 107:5% 0:34 0:11 31:4% 0:67 1:2%
1 and 2, see Table 1.
Given the above one can compare average welfare with separated banking with expected
welfare conditional on a bad systematic shock occurring and banks being universal in nature.
Table 2 contains the results. We nd that to benet from the separation of investment and
commercial banking, an economy has to be hit by a negative systematic shock which is
drawn from the bottom 0.1% of the distribution. Although this result clearly depends on
the distribution, f("); it appears to be robust to reasonable change of parameters.
The Table also suggests that, although a negative systematic shock may increase
government spending when banks have a universal structure, it also increases the interest
rate premium, and therefore the credit spread, when banks are separated.
The key message from Tables 1 and 2 appears to be that the combination of double
marginalization and the interest premium is, in welfare terms, a more costly distortion
compared with distortive government bail-outs.
11. Shock to quality of nancial intermediation
In the previous section, the analysis seemed to suggest that universal banking may have merit
regardless of whether shocks to the investment banking sector were common or idiosyncratic.
Now consider a situation where there is uncertainty as regards the quality of nancial
intermediation, At. Assume that logAt follows a rst order autoregressive process
logAt = log(At 1) + log(ut)
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where log(ut) is normally distributed with zero mean and variance A. When the aggregate
price for nal goods is stable, the price setting equation implies that the price for nancial
intermediation is,
Qt =
( 1)
At:
From this one can easily compute the expected price for nancial intermediation
EtQt+1 =
( 1)
At exp(
1
2
2
A):
Therefore the actual default rate may be higher than expected when returns to the trading
strategy are smaller than expected and from (6.11) can be computed as in (11.1)
"A =
exp(12
2
A)
ut+1
!
1
"D: (11.1)
11.1. Separate banking
It is apparent that government intervention occurs when actual default is higher than a
certain threshold, "c, below which commercial banks make zero prot. This critical value is
recovered from equation (14.20) which equivalent to the following equation (
"cZ
0
"
1
f (") d"+ ("c)
1
1 F ("c)
1
= 0:
In other words, if "A < "c, there is no government intervention, and Gt = 0. From (11.1) we
can conclude that "A < "c when A or u is su¢ciently large,
ut > u =
"D
"c
1
exp(
1
2
2
A):
To simplify the system, (14.21-14.31), rst introduce a new function
GN (ut) =
Gt
Nt 1At 1
(11.2)
= max
8><>: ( 1)ut
1
264"
A(u)Z
0
"
1
f (") d"+ "A(u)
1
1 F ("A(u))
Rht
Rct
375 ; 0
9>=>; :
Consumption in period t + 1 will depend on labour in the current period, Nt and the
realization of ut. Thus,
Ct+1 = NtAt (ut+1 gGN (ut+1)) : (11.3)
The expected value of the inverse of consumption may now be computed
Et
1
Ct+1
=
1
NtAt
24uZ
0
1
u gGN (u))
dFA(u) +
+1Z
u
1
u
dFA(u)
35 = 1
h
t Ct
;
where FA(u) is the CDF of u:
27
Again, dene a new constant
u =
uZ
0
1
u gGN (u))
dFA(u) +
+1Z
u
1
u
dFA(u): (11.4)
Then expected inverse consumption can be computed as
Et
1
Ct+1
=
u
NtAt
=
1
h
t Ct
:
Combining this with the Euler equation recovers a value for labour
Nt uAt R
h
t Ct: (11.5)
And nally combining this with (14.26) and the risk premium yields
Nt u
1 "D
1 ( 1)
exp(
1
2
2
A
1
:
Therefore, labour supply is constant and consumption can be computed from (11.5). That
allows us to perform a welfare analyses reported in the next section.
11.1.1. Comparison to universal banking
As before, with universal banking the risk premium will be zero: Rht = R
C
t : Moreover, in
the absence of a risk premium, there will always be some banks in default and government
support dened in (11.2) will always be positive. In this sense, u = +1 and constant
(11.4) is dened as
1 =
1Z
0
1
u gGuN (u))
dFA(u): (11.6)
So equilibrium labour is given by
Nut 1
1 "D
1 ( 1)
exp(
1
2
2
A):
Using the calibration described previously, and assuming that the variance of log(u) =
0:2, the results for the case of shocks to the quality of capital is presented in Table 3.
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Table 3: quality shocks1 Rh RC C G G=C N Welfare Gain
g = 20%
u = 1; F (u) = 0:5
Separate 2:0% 13:6% 0:61 0 0% 0:60
Universal 1:6% 1:6% 0:69 0 0:2% 0:68 4:0%
u = 0:78; F (u) = 0:1
Separate 4:6% 16:4% 0:47 0 0% 0:60
Universal 5:0% 5:0% 0:53 0:02 3:9% 0:68 3:3%
u = 0:63; F (u) = 0:01
Separate 8:1% 20:4% 0:38 0:02 6:2% 0:60
Universal 9:3% 9:3% 0:42 0:06 13:5% 0:68 2:6%
Although in this particular case both production and consumption are higher under
universal banking, when the shock to capital quality is unfavorable, the impact of the
government bail out may be signicant, especially when the cost of fund raising is high.
Welfare increases from universal banking are negatively related to the realization of the
shock to capital quality as it is shown on gure 2. The intuition for this observation seems
to be that a low draw on nancial e¢ciency is relatively costly in welfare terms since the
output of the nancial sector is larger under universal banking; it is as if nal goods producers
over-invested in nancial capital. It is interesting to see that as the volatility of the shocks
increase, the welfare gain from universal banking is smaller.
Figure 2. Volatility of the quality shock and the welfare gain from UB
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It is also worth noting that universal banking is more desirable the lower is competition
in the banking sector. This can be seen in Figure 3. When competition is weak, mark-
ups are high and government intervention is required less often, therefore the relative costs
of universal banking is lower. As competition increases, ceteris paribus, universal banking
may be less attractive than separated banking in the case where the systematic shock is
unfavorable.
Figure 3. Competition and the welfare gain from UB
11.2. The welfare e¤ect of competition
In this section we analyse the welfare e¤ect of competition. First we consider the case when
the banking sector is subject to a systematic shock. When that shock is moderate, increased
competition still leads to welfare improvement. However, when the shock is particularly
unfavorable, the net gain from competition is smaller and may even be negative, especially
for a universal banking structure Figure 4 shows12 that for a median shock (F (") = 0:5),
an increase in competition leads to higher welfare for both universal and separated banking
structures. However when the shock is relatively low (F (") = 0:1), the relation between
welfare and competition is U-shaped and the optimal competition level is lower for UB than
12UB denotes Universal Banking, SB denotes Separated, Banking and F is the CDF value of the shock.
Welfare is given in consumption equivalent.
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for SB. On average, the gain from competition in good times looks like it dominate the loses
in bad times.
We get a very similar results for the shock to capital quality. Although the optimal level
of competitiveness may be higher in this case.
Figure 4. Competition and the welfare
Systematic shock to banking industry Shock to Quality
12. Summary and conclusion
A basic framework has been developed within which certain key policy questions can begin
to be addressed: What factors determine the riskiness of nancial intermediation? How
does increased competition in the nancial sector impact on the risk prole of nancial
intermediaries? When might universal banking prove be welfare improving? How do these
factors impact macroeconomic outturns?
Our preliminary ndings suggest that the risk prole of investment strategies has a
noncontinuous dependence on the expected return to risky investment: it may switch quite
markedly when the expected return declines.
We investigated the determinants of the interest spread in an economy where default may
occur and where governments stand ready to bail out retail depositors. We found that the
desirability or otherwise of universal banking turns on a key trade-o¤; the eradication of a
double marginalization problem (including the premium) in the nancial sector, versus larger
government bail-outs. That basic trade-o¤ occurs whether shocks to the investment banks
trading strategies are idiosyncratic or common. We tentatively concluded that universal
banking was often preferable; double marginalization is often a more costly distortion than
government bail-outs when the common shock is not too negative.
We also nd that a higher degree of competition is often welfare improving but the
relation may be U-shaped when an economy experiences a negative common shock. The
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optimal level of competitiveness seems to be higher for the separated banking sector that
for the universal one.
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13. Appendix
The following theorem provides a useful inequality concerning integrals of certain functions.
This theorem will be used later in the appendix.
Theorem 13.1. Consider I =
bR
a
u(x)v(x)f(x)dx: where 0 a < b, and for any x 2 [a; b]
where
i) f(x) 0; ii) v(x) is a decreasing and positive function and iii) u(x) is an increasing
function, negative on [a; x0], positive on [x0; b] and where a x0 b: Then the following is
true
I =
bZ
a
u(x)v(x)f(x)dx v(x0)
bZ
a
u(x)f(x)dx: (13.1)
Proof. If x 2 [a; x0]; then u(x) < 0; and v(x) > v(x0); and therefore,
u(x)v(x)f(x) v(x0)u(x)f(x): (13.2)
However, if x 2 [x0; b]; then u(x) > 0; and v(x) < x0; and therefore (13.2) is also true.
Inequality (13.2) implies (13.1).
13.1. The investment banks problem
Here the solution is analyzed to optimization problem (5.11)-(5.15). The Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are used following the maximizing of the Lagrangian (13.3) with respect to three
endogenous variables: the default threshold, "Dt ; the investment in the safe strategy, st, and
the revenue of the threshold investor, Dt: As a matter of notation, in what follows when we
write " we really mean "(j):
L = D 1t
0@"maxZ
"D
(1 st t"t + st t
Dt
( 1)
f (") d" 1 F "Dt
1A
+ (1 st t"
D
t + st t Dt
+ d"
D
t + 0st + 1 (1 st) : (13.3)
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The rst order condition with respect to "Dt is
@L
@"D
= D 1t
(1 st t"
D
t + st t
Dt
( 1)
f("Dt ) f("
D
t )
!
+ (1 st t + d = 0;
which in equilibrium is equivalent to
@L
@"D
= D 1 f("Dt ) f("
D
t ) + (1 st t + d = 0: (13.4)
This implies that either d > 0 and "Dt = 0; or d = 0. When d > 0; formula (13.4) implies that
st 6= 1 and 0: If d > 0 then "Dt = 0 and there is no expected default; it is expected that
any realization of " will be consistent with nonnegative prots. On the other hand, when there is
positive default probability "Dt > 0 it follows that = 0.
Consider the case of positive expected default probability. The rst order condition with respect
to Dt is
( 1)D 2t
24 1+1Z
"D
(1 st t"t + st t
Dt
( 1)
f (") d" 1 F "Dt
35 = 0: (13.5)
When = 0; this implies that
"maxZ
"D
(1 st t"t + st t
(1 st t"Dt + st t
( 1)
f (") d" =
1
1 F "Dt ; (13.6)
and says that expected marginal revenue should be equal to a constant mark up over marginal
costs.
The rst order condition with respect to st is
@L
@st
= D
( 1)
t
1
24+1Z
"D
t t"t
Dt
(1 st t"t + st t
Dt
1
f (") d"
35
+ t t"
D
t + ( 0 1) = 0: (13.7)
13.2. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proposition 5.1 asserts the nonexistence of an internal solution to the investment banking rms
optimization problem. It is now demonstrated that at least one of the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the inequality constraints ( d 0 1) is positive. The argument proceeds by
contradiction.
Assume that an internal solution exists. Then it should satisfy the following equations
"maxZ
0
t t"t
(1 st t"t + st t
(1 st t"t + st t
Dt
( 1)
f (") d" = 0;
"maxZ
0
(1 st t"t + st t
(1 st t"Dt + st t
( 1)
f (") d"
1
1 F "Dt = 0;
(1 st t"
D
t + st t Dt = 0: (13.8)
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To check the necessary second order conditions, one rst constructs the Hessian by di¤erentiating
(13.4), (13.5)and (13.7) :
@2L
@"D@st
= D 2t t t"
D
t
1
f("Dt ) t;
@2L
(@"D)
2 =
1
D 2t f("
D
t ) (1 st t > 0;
@2L
@"D@Dt
=
1
D 2t f("
D
t );
@2L
@D2t
= ( 1)D 3t
1
1 F "Dt < 0;
@2L
@Dt@st
= 0;
@2L
@s2t
= D 1t
1
2
"maxZ
"D
t t"t
Dt
2
(1 st t"t + st t
Dt
1 1
f (") d" < 0:
This problem has only one binding constraint (13.8) with Jacobian
J =
2664
(1 st t
1
t t"
D
t
3775 :
The necessary second order conditions for a constrained local maximum require the Hessian, H;
to be negative denite on the null space of the Jacobian of the binding constraints13. However it
can be shown that that x0Hx > 0 and J 0x = 0; for
x :=
0BB@ t t
"Dt
0
(1 st t
1CCA :
Therefore, every internal solution which satises the rst order conditions, violates the second
order necessary conditions for a local maximum. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.1.
13.3. Proof of Proposition 5.2
Following Proposition 5.1 only two possible solutions are of relevance: First, either there is no
expected default, "D = 0, or second everything is invested in the risky strategy, st = 0: Sometimes
both of those solutions provide for local maxima, and one needs to compute the value function in
order to nd which is the global maximum. Thus, rst consider:
Case 1: d > 0; "D = 0 0 = 1 = 0:
It follows from (13.4) that 0. The optimal investment in the safe strategy solves the
equations
D 2t
1
24( 1) 1Z
0
1 st
st
+ 1
( 1)
f (") d"
35 = 0; (13.9)
D
( 2)
t
1
241Z
0
(1 )
1 st
st
+ 1
1
f (") d"
35 = 0; (13.10)
Dt = st t; (13.11)
13See for example Cornuejols and Tutuincu (2007), page 102.
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where t t. (13.9) is a straightforward implication of (13.5). (13.10) follows from (13.7)
using (13.11). Combining (13.9) and (13.10) gives
( 1)
1Z
0
1 st
st
+ 1
( 1)
f (") d" +
1Z
0
(1 )
1 st
st
+ 1
1
f (") d" = 0: (13.12)
This equation provides an expression for the optimal share of the safe investment. We label this
solution: sbt ( ).
Next consider:
Case 2: d = 0:
If d = 0; then st = 0 since we rule out st = 114. The equilibrium default threshold can then
be found from (13.6)
1Z
"D
"t
"Dt
( 1)
f (") d" =
1
h
1 F "Dt : (13.13)
We now turn to the analysis of (13.12) and (13.13).
13.3.1. Existence of "safe local maximum"
First the case is considered when there is a maximum at the zero default probability border, d > 0;
"Dt = 0: As noted above, a safe local maximum can only exist when 0 and therefore the solution
of (13.12) satises the following inequality (13.9) which is equivalent to
h(st ) :=
1Z
0
1 st
st
+ 1
( 1)
f (") d"
1
< 0: (13.14)
Let st be a solution of h(st ) = 0: It is easy to verify that h(1 ) =
1
1 < 0, and that
@h
@st
< 0:
Also, let sbt be a solution to the rst order condition (13.12). By continuity , s
b
t satises (13.14) if
and only if sbt > st . Note that s
b
t is a solution to (13.12) which we rewrite as
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h1(sbt ) : = 1
+1Z
0
1 sbt
sbt
+ 1
1 1
f (") d" (13.15)
1
1
1 sbt
+1Z
0
"
1 sbt
sbt
+ 1
1
f (") d" = 0:
First, note that (13.15) is negative for st = 1, and that it is a strictly decreasing function with
respect to st for 2. Thus, if h1(st ) is positive then s
b
t > st , and the rst order condition
(13.9) is satised. However, if h1(st ) < 0, then s
b
t < st and the safe maximum does not exist.
Thus, evaluating (13.15) at st , gives
( 1)h1(st ) = 1 st
1Z
0
"
1 st
st
+ 1
1
f (") d": (13.16)
It is useful to dene st in an alternative way. In particular st = +k where k is dened as a
solution to (13.17)
1Z
0
(k "+ 1)
( 1)
f (") d" =
1
: (13.17)
14When s = 1, a safe investment strategy is pursued. The expected probability of default is either zero
or one. In the latter case prot is zero which cannot be optimal.
15We use the fact that (1 ) = ((1 s)=s) + 1 ( ) :
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It is apparent that k is a positive number which does not depend on . Then (13.16) can, in turn,
be rewritten as
( 1)h1(st ) = 1
( + k )
1Z
0
" (k "+ 1) 1 f (") d":
It follows that h1 (st ) declines in , it is positive for = 0 and for any
h. It is negative
for h , where h solves h1 +k = 0
h =
1
0@+1Z
0
" (k "+ 1)
1
f (") d"
1A 1 k > 0:
To complete the proof, the second order conditions are veried.
In this case, the constraint is "D = 0; Dt (1 st t"D st t = 0: The Jacobian is ("D;Dt; st):
J =
"
1 0 0
(1 st t 1
#
:
There is only one null vector of the Jacobian, x0 = (0 1) : To check whether x0Hx < 0, note that
x0Hx =
@2L
@D2t
2 + 2
@2L
@Dt@st
+
@2L
@s2t
< 0:
Lemma 13.2. There exists a threshold level of relative returns h, such that for t
t
h, there
is a unique local maximum at which the default threshold is zero. As the relative return of the
risky strategy rises above h, such a safe local maximum no longer exists.
Finally, note that st in this case may be quite large. In fact, in our simulation example s
increases with t
t
and is larger than 0:6. That is reected in the diagram we provide in the body
of the paper.
13.3.2. Existence of risky local maximum
Now, assume the existence of a local maximum such that F ("D) > 0: It has been shown that in
this case it necessarily follows that st = 0, and "D satises (13.13) which comes from the rst order
necessary condition for an optimum with respect to Dt. Note, that the condition is independent of relative
protability of the risky strategy.
Also the rst order necessary condition with respect to st requires the following condition
1Z
"D
(1 )
"
"Dt
1
f (") d" < 0: (13.18)
We label l, the solution of (13.18) with strict equality. The inequality holds if and only if l; and it is
in this region where the risky strategy can be a local maximum.
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Now we need to verify the second order conditions at s = 0. Thus,
@2L
@"D@st
= D 2t t t"
D
t
1
f("Dt );
@2L
(@"D)2
=
1
D 2t f("
D
t ) (1 st t 0;
@2L
@"D@Dt
=
1
D 2t f("
D
t );
@2L
@D2t
= ( 1)D 3t
1
1 F "Dt < 0;
@2L
@Dt@st
= 0;
@2L
@s2t
= D 1t
1
2
1Z
"D
t t"t
Dt
2 (1 st t"t + st t
Dt
1 1
f (") d" < 0:
In this case there are two constraints: fst = 0; D (1 st t"D st t = 0g; and the Jacobean with respect
to ("D; Dt; st) is
J =
"
0 0 1
(1 st t 1 a
#
:
There is only one null vector of the Jacobean, x0 = (1; t; 0) and it is readily veried that x0Hx < 0 :
x0Hx =
@2L
(@"D)2
t
@2L
@Dt@"D
2
t
@2L
(@Dt)
2
< 0
=
1
D 2t f ("
D
t t tf ("
D
t
2
t
@2L
(@Dt)
2
< 0:
Hence, the following proposition may be stated:
Lemma 13.3. There exists a threshold level of relative returns l such that, for t
t
l, there is a local
maximum corresponding to st = 0 at which the probability of default is zero dened from (13.13) and where
l =
1
"Dt [1 F ("
D
t )]
1
1Z
"D
"t
"D
1
f (") d":
When t
t
l, there is no local maximum such that the probability of default is strictly positive, F ("D) > 0.
Since the expected prot function is continuous, the maximum exists for any value of relative returns. So,
one would expect that l h, since otherwise, expected prot would have no maximum for 2
h
h l
i
;
which cannot be the case for a continuous function on a compact domain.
Therefore, it has been proved that there exists l h such that when:
1. t
t
l, there is only one type of solution, which corresponds to a strategy with zero probability of
default;
2. l < t
t
h; there are two local maxima, one corresponds to zero default and another corresponds
to the risky strategy;
3. t
t
h, there is only one solution to the optimization problem and it corresponds to investment in
the risky strategy only.
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13.4. Strategy with zero expected default: proof of Corollary 5.5
The Lagrangian for the problem (5.18, 5.19) is
L (N; s) =
+1Z
0
Et
h
Qt+1 (Xt+1)
1 ([(1 st t"+ st t]Nt)
( 1)
i
f (") d" WtR
C
t Nt
+ sEt
h
Qt+1 (Xt+1)
1 (st tNt)
( 1) WtR
C
t Nt
i
+ 1(1 s) + 0s:
It is easy to see that 0 = 0; (otherwise constraint (5.19) is never satised). The rst order conditions are
@L (N; s)
@s
= EtQt+1 (Xt+1)
1 N
1 1
t
1
+1Z
0
t" t) [(1 st t"+ st t]
1 f (") d"
+
1 s
s
Et
h
Qt+1 (Xt+1)
1 (st tNt)
( 1)
i
1; (13.19)
@L (N; s)
@N
Nt = EtQt+1 (Xt+1)
1 N
1 1
t
1
+1Z
0
[(1 st t"+ st t]
1 1 f (") d" WtR
C
t Nt
+ sEt
1
Qt+1 (Xt+1)
1 (st tNt)
( 1) WtR
C
t Nt : (13.20)
There are three cases to examine:
Case 1. Consider s = 1, 1 > 0: The constraint will satisfy
tEtQt+1 (Xt+1 tNt)
1 > WtR
C
t :
The rst order conditions with respect to N is
@L (N; s)
@N
Nt = EtQt+1 (Xt+1)
1 ( tNt)
1 1 1 WtR
C
t Nt
+ s
1
Et
h
Qt+1 (Xt+1)
1 ( tNt)
( 1) WtR
C
t Nt
i
; (13.21)
and with respect to s is
@L (N; s)
@s 1
( tNt)
( 1) = ( t 1) + s 1 1
( tNt)
( 1) Et
h
Qt+1 (Xt+1)
1
i 1
= 0: (13.22)
It is easy to check if s is zero. If s > 0;then
EtQt+1 (Xt+1)
1 ( tNt)
( 1) =WtR
C
t Nt (13.23)
and (13.21) is violated Since s = 0; condition (13.22) is equivalent to t 1: Now one may conclude that
s = 1 and zero probability of default is optimal if and only if t 1:
Case 2. Consider s > 0; then we already know that 1 = 0: The constraint (5.19) is binding and the
rst order conditions (13.19, 13.20) become
+1Z
0
( t" 1)
1 st
st
t"+ 1
1
f (") d" = s > 0; (13.24)
( 1)
+1Z
0
(1 st)
st
t"+ 1
1 1
f (") d" = s > 0; (13.25)
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These relations can be rewritten as:
+1Z
0
( t" 1)
1 st
st
t"+ 1
1
f (") d" = ( 1)
+1Z
0
(1 st)
st
t"+ 1
1 1
f (") d" (13.26)
which solves for optimal s:
Note that conditions (13.24) and (13.25) are completely opposite to (13.9), (13.10). Above we have
shown that (13.9) and (13.10) are satised when t
h: Using a similar approach (13.24) and (13.25) are
shown to be satised when t
h: Moreover, since equation (13.26) is the same as (13.12) we can conclude
that constraint (5.19) is binding if and only t
h:
Case 3. Consider the remaining case t 2
h
1 h
i
. In this case 1 = s = 0 and there is an internal
solution, which can be found from the rst order conditions
+1Z
0
( 1)
1 s
s
+ 1
1
f (") d" = 0; (13.27)
Et (Xt+1=Ntst t)
1
+1Z
0
1 s
s
+ 1
1 1
f (") d" =
1
Et
WtR
C
t
Qt+1
: (13.28)
That completes the proof.
13.5. Proof that (13.27) implies 0
Dene a function as follows
) =
+1Z
0
( 1)
1 s
s
+ 1
1
f (") d" = 0: (13.29)
Now use the implicit function theorem ds = @@ =@s , where
@
@s
=
1
s2
1
+1Z
0
( 1)
1
s
1 + 1
1 1
f (") d":
That equation may be rewritten as
@
@s
=
1
s(1 s)
1
+1Z
0
( 1)
1
s
1 + 1
1
f (") d"; (13.30)
1
s(1 s)
1
+1Z
0
( 1)
1 s
s
+ 1
1 1
f (") d": (13.31)
The rst line (13.30) is zero by denition of(13.29). Now one may apply theorem 13.1 to the second line,
(13.31) with u(") = ( 1) ; and v(") = 1 ss + 1 ; to nd that
@
@s
s(1 s) =
1Z
0
( 1)
1 s
s
+ 1
1 1
f (") d" (13.32)
>
1Z
0
( 1)
1 s
s
+ 1
1
= 0:
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That proves that @@s > 0: The other derivative,
@ ; is also positive, since
@
=
+1Z
0
"
1 s
s
+ 1
1
f (") d"
1
+1Z
0
( 1)
1 s
s
"
1 s
s
+ 1
1 1
f (") d":
The rst term is positive, while the second term is proved to be positive in (13.32). This completes the
proof that when 1, investment in the safe trading strategy is declining in the relative rates of return,
ds < 0:
13.6. Switching between strategies
Now compare expected prots, Et
i (i stands for risk; mixed or safe) under alternative trading strategies:
"risky" means s = 0 , "mixed" means 0 < s < 1 and "safe" means s = 1. We have shown that in general
expected prot is proportional to expected cost
Et
i =
1
1
WtR
C
t N
i
t
h
1 F "Dt ;
where N it is the demand for labour for the corresponding trading strategy, as in (5.9). Therefore, expected
prots for the various strategies are:
Et
safe =
1
1 WtRCt
1 h
EtX
1
t+1 (Qt+1)
i
; (13.33)
Et
risk =
1
1
1 F "Dt
"Dt
WtRCt
1
1
h
EtX
1
t+1 (Qt+1)
i
; (13.34)
Et
mixed =
1
1
st t
WtRCt
1
24 1+1Z
0
1 s
s t
"+ 1
1 1
f (") d"
35 hEtX1t+1 (Qt+1)i :(13.35)
It has been established that when h the risky strategy dominates both the safe and mixed strategies.
Now consider the case where h:
For what follows, it is helpful to prove the following corollaries:
Corollary 13.4. There exists a unique sw1 2 0 h ; such that if sw1; then Et risk < safe; and
if sw1; then Et risk > safe where
sw1 is dened as
sw1 = 1 F "Dt
1=( 1)
="Dt : (13.36)
Proof. Consider the ratio
1( ) = Et
risk( )= safe = 1 F "Dt
D
t
1
: (13.37)
It is an increasing function with 1(0) = 0; and 1(
h) > 1:
Corollary 13.5. There exists a unique sw2 2 0 h such that if sw2; then Et risk < Et mixed;
and if sw2; then Et risk > Et mixed:
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Proof. Consider the ratio
2( ) = Et
risk=Et
mixed
= 1 F "Dt
"Dt
st
1
1
24+1Z
0
1
s
1 "+
1
1 1
f (") d"
35 :
The relation between s and is given in (13.27). First, one can show that that 2( ) is an increasing
function of By direct di¤erentiation, it is easy to prove that @ > 0; and @@s < 0. It is proved in section
(13.5) that ds < 0: Therefore d 2 = d 2 + d 2@s
ds > 0: It is also known that h) > 1 and that l) < 1:
Hence, by continuity there exists a unique sw2 which solves sw2) = 1 and moreover sw2 2
h
l h
i
:
To continue we will also need the following two short lemmas.
Lemma 13.6. If sw1 sw2. Then sw1 > 1: And if sw2; then zero default is expected, while if
sw2; the risky strategy is more protable.
Proof. By contradiction. Let sw1 < 1:Et case3 sw1 < s1 = Et risk sw1 : But since
sw1 sw2; this contradicts to Corollary 13.5. Therefore, sw2 sw1 > 1:
Furthermore, when sw1 sw2, one can conclude that if sw2; the prot maximizing strategy
entails s = 0; whilst for 2 1 sw2 the optimal strategy is 0 < s < 1, with zero expected default.
Lemma 13.7. If sw1 sw2, then sw1 < 1: That implies that only two strategies are possible: i) s = 0,
for sw1; and ii) s = 1, for sw1:
Proof. If sw1 sw2 then Corollary 13.4 implies that s1 = Et risk sw1 > Et case3 sw1 : But
from Corollary 5.5 we know that s1 > Et case3 ( ) ; if and only if 1:
Now dene sw = max( sw1 sw2): Then we can prove that sw is a threshold such if sw; there
is no default and if sw; then s = 0. That complete the proof of the Proposition.
13.7. Proof that t+1 declines in "A
In the main text, the relationship between aggregate net assets and the default threshold was examined. It
was asserted that t+1 declines in "A and that commercial banks will have negative net assets only when
the actual default rate is greater than some threshold value, "A > "C : The basis for that statement is now
examined. Recall from the text that
t+1 "
A = Qt+1Xt+1
264"
AZ
0
h " i 1
f (") d"+
"A
1
1 F ("A)
Rht
Rct
375 : (13.38)
First, the existence and uniqueness of the solution to
t+1 "
C = 0; "C > 0; (13.39)
is established. To prove uniqueness, di¤erentiate this expression with respect to "A to nd that
@ t+1 "
A
@"A
=
1 1
"A
"A
1
1 F ("A)
Rht
Rct
:
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It is ascertained that when t+1 "A < 0;expression 1 F ("A)
Rht
Rct
is also negative and therefore
@ t+1("A)
@"A
< 0. Moreover, it is clear that at its maximum "0, we have that
F ("0) = 1
Rht
Rct
:
Note, we assume R
h
t
Rct
< 1. Expression (13.38) is positive and for any "A < "0;
@ t+1("A)
@"A
> 0. One can also see
that t+1 (0) = 0. Therefore, there is no solution on (0; "0] and
@ t+1("A)
@"A
< 0for any "A > "0: Any strictly
monotone function can not have more than one zero point and so uniqueness is established.
Existence is not guaranteed and depends on the distribution. However, existence is guaranteed if and
only if t+1 ("max) < 0. Below we establish existence for the specic case of innite domain, when "max = +1.
Recall the formula for the deposit-loan spread:
RCt =
1
1
Rht ; (13.40)
where
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"DtZ
0
"
"D
1
f(")d"+
h
1 F ("Dt )
i
< 1: (13.41)
Using these expressions in (13.38) one obtains
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It follows then, that
t+1 "
A
Qt+1Xt+1 "A
1
<
264"
D
tZ
0
"
"D
1
f(")d"
("A)
1
375 1 "
D
tZ
0
1
"
"D
1
f(")d": (13.43)
Therefore it is always possible to nd "A so that expression (13.43) is negative. That completes the proof
of existence for the case of innite domain.
If the domain is nite and t+1 ("
max) > 0: Then the economy is safe and the government intervention
is never required when commercial and investment banking sectors are separated.
It is also useful to prove that t+1 "D > 0; such that government intervention is not required when
actual default is equal to expected default. The proof follows immediately from (13.42)
t+1 "
D
Qt+1Xt+1 "D
1
=
1
264"
D
tZ
0
"
"D
1
f(")d"+ 1 F ("Dt )
375 > 0:
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14. Aggregate equations and numerical analysis
To analyze the implications of the model for universal banking we compare welfare in the stochastic steady
state of the model with and without universal banking. In what follows, unless otherwise indicated in the
tables of the text, the parameterization of the steady state uses the following values:
= 1 = 0:96 = 1; A = 1; t = 1:02; a = 1 = 9 = 4; g = 0:2 = 0:2 = 10:
A key parameter is , the standard deviation of the shock to the trading strategies. In order to get a rough
guide on a reasonable value for this parameter we proceeded as follows. In the numerical analysis we employ
the lognormal distribution f(") with parameters and . Parameter is naturally chosen by normalization
of the mean so that E(") = 1 implies = 2=2: The following data looks at the empirical volatility of the
log returns to banking equity. The data, taken form yahoo nance is the volatility of quarterly log returns.
Table UK St. Dev Time period
BARCLAYS 0.250 Q1 2003-Q2 2011
HSBC 0.106 Q3 2000-Q2 2011
Santander 0.170 Q3 2006-Q2 2011
RBS 0.343 Q1 2003-Q2 2011
Lloyds 0.200 Q3 2000-Q2 2011
Table USA St. Dev Time period
Bank of America Corporation 0.208 Q3 1986-Q2 2011
The Goldman Sachs Group 0.168 Q3 1999-Q2 2011
JPMorgan Chase 0.166 Q1 1984-Q2 2011
Morgan Stanley 0.170 Q2 1993-Q2 2011
Credit Suisse Group 0.161 Q1 1999-Q2 2011
Citigroup 0.190 Q1 1977-Q2 2011
As our base case, therefore, we set = 0:2.
14.1. Idiosyncratic shocks with separated banks
In steady state "A = "D: When commercial banks are separated from investment banks, it is possible
to diversify the risk completely. All commercial banks have the same positive prot t+1 > 0; there is
no default in the commercial banking industry and "C = 0: Furthermore, no government intervention is
required, Gt = 0: Thus, the equations of the steady state of the model are
=
1
Rh
; (14.1)
C =
w
; (14.2)
q =
( 1)
A; (14.3)
Y = AX; (14.4)
X N (14.5)
C
q
"Dt
1
; (14.6)
RC =
1
1
Rh; (14.7)
C = Y: (14.8)
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14.2. Systematic shocks and separate banking
The full set of equations are
Et
t
Ct+1
1
t+1
=
1
Rht
; (14.9)
Ct =
wt
; (14.10)
qt =
( 1)
At; (14.11)
Yt = AtXt; (14.12)
Xt+1 tNt"t+1; (14.13)
EtXt+1 tNt; (14.14)
Nt = EtXt+1
h
t"
D
t+1
i 1 wtRCt
t+1qet+1
; (14.15)
RCt = 1
1
s
Rht ; (14.16)
Ct = Yt gGt; (14.17)
Gt = R
h
tWtNtmax 1
"
"C
; 0
i
; (14.18)
"At+1
"D
1
=
EtQt+1
Qt+1
; (14.19)
"C =
Rht
RCt
"A; (14.20)
14.3. Idiosyncratic shocks and shocks to the e¢ciency of capital
Here we have additional state variable, At 1; which we set to be equal to 1 when simulating results of Table
3.
Et
t
Ct+1
=
1
Rht
; (14.21)
At = At 1ut; (14.22)
Etqt+1 =
( 1)
At exp(
1
2
2
A); (14.23)
qt =
( 1)
At; (14.24)
Xt Nt 1 (14.25)
tR
C
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1 "D
1 ( 1)
At exp(
1
2
2
A); (14.26)
RCt = 1
1
Rht ; (14.27)
Ct = At Nt 1 gGt; (14.28)
Gt = max( t "
A ; 0); (14.29)
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At Nt 1
1
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3775 ; (14.30)
"At =
exp( 1
2
2
A)
ut
!
1
"D: (14.31)
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